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Abstract 
 Based on a two-stage analysis of a panel of data on 12 outlets of a high-end retailer for 24 
months, we investigate how the level of supervisory monitoring affects retail sales productivity. 
In the first stage, we use Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to compute the relative productivity 
of retail outlets in using their labor and capital resources to generate store sales. In the second 
stage, we regress the logarithm of DEA scores on contextual variables to obtain consistent 
estimators of the impact of contextual variables on productivity (Banker and Natarajan in 
Operation Research 56:48-58, 2008). Contrary to agency theoretic prediction that supervisory 
monitoring leads to an increase in retail sales productivity, our empirical results indicate that the 
higher the level of supervisory monitoring, the lower is the retail sales productivity for high-end 
retail outlets. 
 
Keywords: Efficiency • DEA • Retail sector 
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The impact of supervisory monitoring on high-end retail sales productivity 
 
Introduction 
 
 Improving productivity is an increasingly important objective of many retailers. To 
achieve this objective, many retailers employ supervisory monitoring to motivate and direct their 
salesforce. There has been little formal empirical evidence, however, on whether supervisory 
monitoring increases retail sales productivity. To explore this issue, we perform a two-stage 
analysis of the impact of supervisory monitoring on the productivity of 12 high-end retail outlets 
over 24 months. We first estimate the productivity of each outlet in each month using the 
nonparametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method. Next, we regress the productivity 
score on potential contextual factors that affect it to obtain consistent estimators of the impact of 
key performance drivers at our research site (Banker and Natarajan 2008). 
 Agency theoretic research in marketing has examined the role of monitoring of 
salesperson’s effort to alleviate moral hazard (Basu et al. 1985; Lal and Srinivasan 1993; Joseph 
and Thevaranjan 1998) Agency theory suggests that monitoring provides an imperfect signal on 
the salesperson’s effort, and compensating the salesperson based on this signal induces higher 
effort. This imperfect monitoring signal can be interpreted similar to behavior-based control (e.g. 
Anderson and Oliver 1987, p. 77) which posits that supervisors who “have a well-defined idea of 
what they want salespeople to do” can work to ensure that the salesforce behaves accordingly. 
Therefore, retailers are likely to employ the monitoring ability of supervisors to increase the 
productivity of retail selling activities. There has been little empirical evidence, however, to 
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assess whether this agency theoretic prediction holds for high-end retail outlets in which 
customer-focused service involves greater worker empowerment and task ambiguity. 
 In contrast to agency theory, organizational control theory suggests that behavior-based 
control requiring high level of supervisory monitoring is not appropriate in an environment 
characterized by low task programmability (Anderson and Oliver 1987; Eisenhardt 1985, 1988; 
Ouchi 1979). In high-end retail organizations, customer-focused service is likely to involve 
greater worker empowerment and lower task programmability. Supervisory monitoring is likely 
to constrain the salespeople from exploring creative new ways to provide higher levels of 
customer service. Therefore, increasing the level of supervisory monitoring is likely to 
undermine retail sales productivity. 
 We evaluate these two competing hypotheses using data on input, output, supervisory 
monitoring and other contextual variables collected from 12 retail outlets of a department store 
company for 24 months. Our research site is a company positioned at the high end of the 
department store industry. Its strategic positioning is to command premium prices for its 
merchandise by providing exceptionally high level of service to its customers, going beyond 
simply ringing up the cash register or responding to customers’ requests. 
 We use Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to first assess the relative productivity of 
each retail outlet in each month in using its labor and capital resources to generate store sales. 
We rely on the theoretical results of Banker and Natarajan (2008) for a formal justification of the 
use of the two-stage method in DEA. They show that the DEA estimator of productivity obtained 
from the usual analysis of input-output data can be regressed in the second stage on contextual 
factors believed to contribute to productivity differences. Specifically, they prove that the 
second-stage regression provides consistent estimators of the impact of the contextual factors on 
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productivity. Their simulation results indicate that the two-stage DEA- based procedure performs 
substantially better than the one-stage parametric methods that rely on commonly used 
parametric functional forms such as translog and Cobb-Douglas to specify the production 
correspondence, which in turn outperform the two-stage parametric methods to evaluate the 
impact of contextual variables on productivity.
1
 Using this two-stage approach, we find that 
contrary to agency theoretic prediction, supervisory monitoring leads to an increase in retail sales 
productivity. The higher the level of supervisory monitoring, the lower is the retail sales 
productivity for the high-end department store that emphasizes customer-focused service as a 
way to gain strategic competitive advantage. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our research 
hypothesis. Section 3 describes the data and the estimation model employed for the empirical 
analysis. Section 4 contains the results of our analysis. Section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
 
Hypothesis development 
 
 Competition in the retail industry has become very intense in recent years. To survive and 
continue to prosper in this competitive environment, increasing productivity is viewed as a 
necessity. Our research site is a retailer positioned at the high end of the spectrum for department 
stores. It offers service that is perceived by its customers to be superior and unique relative to 
service provided by its competitors. It has achieved differentiation through its innovative 
customer-focused service, resulting in the willingness of customers to pay premium prices 
                                                          
1
 Their simulation results also indicate that DEA-based methods perform significantly better than 
one-stage and two-stage parametric methods in the estimation of individual decision making unit 
(DMU) productivity. More recent research documents that it outperforms bootstrap methods. 
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(Porter 1996). Customer-focused service involves understanding and satisfying individual needs, 
which differ widely across customers. Therefore, the tasks performed by its salespeople are more 
challenging, more difficult to prescribe and less programmable than the tasks required for a more 
conventional, mass-production-style service at a low-end department or discount store. The main 
role of supervisors at a low-end retail outlet is to have a well-defined idea of what the 
salespeople should do and to monitor them closely to ensure that they comply with the 
prescribed activities. At a high-end retail outlet, the role of the supervisors is much more 
ambiguous in supporting the salespeople. 
 Agency theory argues that if an agent’s actions can be monitored more precisely, desired 
actions can be induced with lower risk premium costs, which in turn leads to an improvement in 
organizational productivity (Lambert 2001). There has been little empirical evidence, however, 
on whether this agency theoretic prediction holds for high-end retail outlets in which customer-
focused service involves greater worker empowerment and task ambiguity. This is especially 
important since monitoring of ambiguous tasks may not provide more informative signals, and 
the simple interpretation of the theoretical analysis may not apply. 
 Organizational control theory suggests behavior-based control requiring a high level of 
supervisory monitoring is not appropriate in an environment characterized by low task 
programmability (Anderson and Oliver 1987; Eisenhardt 1985, 1988; Ouchi 1979). Workers 
involved in customer service need to be empowered because the exact tasks required to improve 
customer satisfaction cannot be prespecified, as different customers have different needs, and 
their service expectations often differ from those of the management (Schlesinger and Heskett 
1991). Therefore, in high-end retail organizations, customer-focused service is likely to involve 
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greater worker empowerment and task ambiguity, and increasing the level of supervisory 
monitoring is less likely to improve retail sales productivity. 
 The employee motivation literature has built on Vroom’s (1964) expectancy theory and 
posits that workers will exert a level of effort in their jobs that they believe will lead to desired 
outcome. The theory suggests that employee perceptions are moderated by the degree to which 
she believes that the reward is possible (Pool 1997; Churchill et al. 1979). If at our research site 
salespeople are internally motivated to exert more effort in their jobs because of the intrinsic 
value of the work to them, and not because they are closely monitored by supervisors, excessive 
monitoring by supervisors may actually stifle creativity and innovation from the salespeople 
(Maslow 1954). The literature on employee creativity also finds that most creative work occurs 
when work is complex and challenging, and supervision is supportive and noncontrolling 
(Oldham and Cummings 1996). In a similar vein, Zhou (2003) demonstrates that when creative 
coworkers are present, the less supervisors engage in close monitoring, the more the employees 
exhibit creativity. 
 Therefore, we state our main research hypothesis formally as follows: 
 
   The impact of supervisory monitoring on retail sales productivity is negative. 
 
Data description and estimation model 
Data and variables 
 
 Each individual store-month in our sample represents a decision-making unit (DMU). We 
model the production function relating the output of each DMU as a function of its inputs such as 
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labor and capital, and contextual variables including supervisory monitoring. Goodman (1985) 
and Thurik and Kooiman (1986) argue that sales should be the principal measure of output to 
identify ineffective use of inputs. Achabal et al. (1984) suggest that additional measures of 
ability to produce also need to be included as control variables. In our empirical setting, we 
measure output as monthly sales (SALES) in deflated dollars.
2
 Since sales alone may not capture 
the strategies pursued by retail units, we consider multiple contextual variables (Venkatraman 
and Ramanujam 1986; Chakravarthy 1986; Lewin and Minton 1986). 
 Past research has included store size, labor usage, and capital investment as inputs in the 
production function (Nooteboom 1983; Ingene 1982, 1985; Hise et al. 1983; Good 1984; Lusch 
and Moon 1984; Doutt 1984; Ratchford and Brown 1985; Thurik and Kooiman 1986; Kamakura 
et al. 1996; Samiee 1990). To capture the labor input in the production function, we utilize the 
number of selling hours in each store each month (HOURS). The two major forms of capital 
investments in the retail setting are the selling space utilized and the merchandise carried by the 
store. Accordingly, we include the size of the store in square feet (SIZE) and the dollar value of 
average inventory of merchandise (INVENTORY). INVENTORY is calculated as the mean of 
the opening and closing inventories carried by the store for a given month. To reflect input 
factors other than labor and capital, we include support activity expenses (SUPPORT) measured 
as other operating expenses exclusive of cost of goods sold, managerial and supervisory salaries, 
and wages for the sales personnel.
3
 
                                                          
2
 Banker et al. (2007) prove that DEA using the aggregate sales measure provides an aggregate 
measure of managerial and allocative efficiency in choosing the optimal mix of merchandise 
sold. 
3
 All variables measured in dollars are deflated by the Department Store Merchandise Price 
Index calculated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics to make them comparable over different 
months. 
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 We also include several contextual variables. The retail manager does not control the area 
in which each store is located, the demographics of the store location in terms of median 
household income, median age, median family size, percentage of the population with college 
education, size of county population, and the intensity of the competition faced by each retail 
store. To capture the differences in the location of the stores, we include an indicator variable 
RURAL whose value is 1 if the store is located in a rural area, otherwise 0. To account for 
different demographics of the store locations, we include INCOME to represent median 
household income, AGE to reflect median age of county population, FAMSIZE to measure 
median family size, COLLEGE to reflect the percentage of the population with college 
education, POPUL to control for total population size in a specific geographical area. Stores in 
upscale and less heavily populated markets are likely to enjoy higher productivity as upscale 
customers value customer service and are attracted by enhanced customer service more than 
other customers (Peterson et al. 1989; Banker et al. 1996). Specifically, retail sales productivity 
is likely to be higher for stores located in those regions where customers have higher household 
incomes, there is a higher proportion of older households with greater wealth, the family size is 
smaller, and the proportion of better-educated customers is higher. To capture the differences in 
the intensity of the competitive environment, we include the index COMPET constructed at our 
research site to measure the number and quality of competitors. Stores in a more competitive 
environment are likely to be less productive in generating retail sales. However, with greater 
competition, higher levels of quality may play a more critical role in attracting and retaining 
customers. Therefore, the impact of competition on retail sales productivity is an empirical 
question. 
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 The contextual variable included to evaluate our principal hypothesis is supervisory 
monitoring (MONITOR) constructed as the ratio of the number of managers supervising the 
salespeople to the number of salespeople at each store. Furthermore, we include monthly sales 
index for other high-end department stores (SINDEX) obtained from the company to control for 
economy-wide and industry-wide effects and an indicator variable, SEASON, whose value is 1 
during the holiday sales season spanning October, November, and December, and 0 otherwise, to 
control for the seasonal nature of the retail business. The relationship between inputs, output and 
contextual variables is depicted in Fig. 1. 
 
 
Insert Figure 1 Here 
 
 
Basic model to evaluate the impact of contextual variables on productivity 
 Consider observations on          stores for          months. Each observation 
      comprises one output    , a vector of inputs                  , and a vector of 
contextual variables                   that may influence the overall retail selling 
productivity. The non-negative scalar    , and vectors     and     are strictly positive in at least 
one dimension. 
 We specify the true production function        and an error term  . The production 
function        is monotone increasing and concave in  , and relates the input vector   to the 
output   as specific by the equation 
            
   
 
                           
The random variable representing the error    is itself generated by the process 
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where     represents random noise for observation       and has a two-sided distribution,     
represents technical inefficiency and has a one-sided distribution and the contextual variables 
     are all non-negative. The error attributable to only noise and technical inefficiency is 
specified as            . 
 Following Banker and Natarajan (2008), we impose the following structure on the 
probability density functions generating the various variables: 
                           
                           
                        
                         
  
 Further, the probability density functions        ,        ,       and       are all 
independent of each other. Each stochastic variable has finite variance and the mean of the noise 
variable,     , is zero. 
 This representation as in Banker and Natarajan (2008) specifies output as a general 
nonparametric function of inputs and an error term, and the error term as consisting of three 
distinct components: a linear function of contextual variables, a one-sided inefficiency term and 
a two-sided random noise term bounded above. Except for the additional component involving 
the contextual variables, this specification of the error term is analogous to composed error term 
formulations in parametric stochastic frontier models. Banker and Natarajan (2008) provide 
theoretical and simulation-based justification for the use of a two-stage method that uses DEA in 
IMPACT OF MONITORING ON RETAIL SALES PRODUCTIVITY        12 
 
the first stage and OLS regression in the second stage to evaluate the impact of contextual 
variables on productivity. 
 
Estimation models 
 Following Banker and Natarajan (2008), we use the DEA model of Banker, Charnes and 
Cooper (BCC) (1984) in the first stage of the empirical analysis to evaluate the productivity 
scores of the different observations represented as DMUjt for store           , and month 
          . There are             observations. We use the output-oriented BCC model 
to evaluate the productivity scores using a set of four inputs to produce one output. Recall that 
the single output is monthly sales in deflated dollars (SALES), and the four inputs are the 
number of selling hours (HOURS), the size of the store in square feet (SIZE), the dollar value of 
average inventory of merchandise (INVENTORY), and support activity expense (SUPPORT). 
The formulation of this output-oriented BCC model for estimating the productivity        
         of an observation   
      is given by the following linear program: 
                
subject to 
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where 
    : quantity of input   consumed by DMUjt 
   : quantity of output   produced by DMUjt 
   : weight placed on inputs/outputs of DMUjt 
        : quantities of inputs, output for DMUjt being evaluated 
 
The linear program is solved for each observation         for           and          . 
 To evaluate our main hypothesis about the impact of supervisory monitoring, we regress 
the logarithm of the productivity estimator      (reciprocal of the estimated inefficiency    ) on 
the contextual variables in the second stage, using the full panel of pooled data. Banker and 
Natarajan (2008) show that this two-stage procedure involving nonparametric estimation of 
productivity in the first stage followed by OLS regression provides statistically consistent 
estimators. Specifically the regression we estimate is represented as: 
            
            
           
           
           
     
   
            
            
          
           
        
     
where 
        the logarithm of productivity for store   in month  , 
          the ratio of the number of managers to the number of salespeople in store  , 
         monthly sales index for other high-end department stores in month  , 
         1 if month   is October, November, or December, otherwise zero, 
         median household income of the county in which store   is located, 
      median age of population in the county in which store   is located, 
          median family size for county in which store   is located, 
          the percentage of the population with college education for the county in 
which store   is located, 
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        population size in the county in which store   is located, 
        1 if store   is located in a rural area, otherwise 0, 
         the competition intensity of store  ’s market, 
     are random errors,           and         . 
  
 
Empirical results 
 
 Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on output, inputs and contextual variables. The 
median values of the output variable (SALES) and the four input variables (HOURS, SIZE, 
INVENTORY, SUPPORT) are all smaller than their mean values, indicating that the data are 
skewed to the right. The contextual variable representing our principal hypothesis is MONITOR, 
its mean is 24% and its median is 23%. 
 Figure 2 shows the frequency curve for DEA productivity scores for our pooled sample 
of 288 observations computed using the BCC model in (4). The interquartile range for the 
productivity scores is from 0.53 to 0.75. The mean of the DEA productivity scores is 0.66 and 
the median is 0.65. Out of the 288 observations, 33 observations are on the production frontier. 
 Table 2 presents Pearson and Spearman correlations between DEA productivity score and 
contextual variables used in estimation model (5). There is a statistically insignificant negative 
correlation between      and MONITOR, before controlling for the impact of the contextual 
variables. 
 In the second stage of our empirical analysis, we regress the logarithm of DEA 
productivity scores on the contextual variables. Because pooled cross-sectional and times-series 
information is used to estimate the impact of contextual variables on retail sales productivity, 
there is the potential for serial correlation biasing the standard errors of the coefficients. 
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Therefore, we performed specification tests for residuals to check serial correlations and found 
that there exists substantial positive serial correlation (parameter estimate = 0.197,       ). 
We address this problem by using a variant of the Prais-Winsten (1954) estimator proposed by 
Park and Mitchell (1980) to make first-order autocorrelation adjustments to the variables. This 
estimator is consistent and performs especially well for short time series and trended data in 
relation to several other estimates (Doran and Griffiths 1983). It also reduces the extent to which 
the serial correlation coefficient tends to be underestimated by simpler methods (Kmenta and 
Gilbert 1970). We test our hypothesis using the parameter estimates from the regression using 
the transformed variables. 
 We present the empirical results in Table 3. The coefficients on all the control variables 
except INCOME are statistically significant. The estimated coefficient on MONITOR is negative 
and significant (t = -3.64) at the 1% level. Thus, after controlling for economy-wide effects, the 
differences in the location of each store, the demographics of the store locations, and the 
intensity of the competitive environment, the results provide strong support for our main 
hypothesis that supervisory monitoring has a negative impact on retail sales productivity in high-
end stores. 
 
 
Insert Table 1 Here 
 
 
 
Insert Table 2 Here 
 
 
 
Insert Table 3 Here 
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Insert Figure 2 Here 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In this study, we investigated how the level of supervisory monitoring affects retail sales 
productivity using a panel of data for 12 outlets of a high-end retailer for 24 months. First, using 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), we computed the relative productivity of retail outlets in 
using their labor, capital and other resources (represented by total selling hours, store size, 
average inventory, and support activities) in order to generate (deflated) store sales. We then 
regressed the logarithm of DEA productivity scores on contextual variables to consistently 
estimate the impact of the contextual factors on productivity and evaluate their statistical 
significance (Banker and Natarajan 2008). 
 Contrary to conventional wisdom in agency theory that supervisory monitoring leads to 
an increase in retail sales productivity, our empirical results indicate that supervisory monitoring 
results in a negative impact on retail sales productivity for the high-end department store that 
emphasizes customer-focused service as a way to gain strategic competitive advantage. 
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Figure 1. Input-output model. 
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Figure 2. Frequency curve for DEA productivity scores.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics on output, inputs and contextual variables ( N = 288). 
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Table 2. Correlation matrix (p-value in parentheses) 
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Table 3.  Estimated of regression of logarith of productivity estimates on contextual variables (t 
statistics in paraentheses) 1n             
  MONITORj     
  SINDEXj    
  SEASONj 
    
 INCOMEj    
  AGEj    
  FAMSIZEj    
  COLLEGEj    
  POPULj    
  RURALj 
     
  COMPETj  +     
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